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1. INTRODUCTION
This paper is about political parties that have made immigration their main
issue and used immigrants as scapegoats for their countries’ social problems. It is
not on racism in general nor do we restrict ourselves to extreme right parties. The
parties we discuss are potential members of a political family which prospers
against the background of recent developments in European societies.
First, unemployment has become a structural characteristic of Western
European economies. In all Western European countries, the unemployment ratio
is persistently above 10 per cent among the adult population aged between 18
and 65. Even economic growth does not seem to help the employment figures.
‘Jobless growth’ has become the dominant feature of these economies. And
where the number of jobs grow they no not keep pace with the population growth.
Secondly, the number of immigrants from outside Western Europe has
increased steadily and created a European-wide policy problem. There is no
country where the right to asylum is not a hotly debated issue. There is no
country where illegal immigration has not aroused considerable attention. In
addition to that we find a population growth which is higher among the immigrant
population than among the native population.
Thirdly, all European governments, whether socialist or conservative, have
implemented neo-liberal policies in the last two decades or so. These policies are
based on the assumption that the market is a better mechanism to solve social
problems than is state intervention with its governmental bureaucracy. Due to
these neo-liberal policies economic inequalities have increased considerably and
society has become more fragmented. Hence, the fear of an ethnic underclass
has become a new specter in European politics.
Fourthly, racist violence has become endemic in most European countries.
In Germany, racist violence caused the death of 17 immigrants in 1992. Although
racist violence has recently received attention in the media, it is definitely not a
recent phenomenon. In 1973 12 Algerian casualties from racist attacks were
reported in France. At the end of the sixties, ‘Paki-bashing’ was popular among
British hooligans. Yet the few systematic and quantitative studies that have been
done suggest that terrorist attacks have indeed increased spectacularly during
the nineties (Björgo and Witte, 1993:32; Koopmans, 1995).
Since 1984, and even earlier in Great Britain and The Netherlands, anti-
immigrant parties have been increasingly successful in national and European
elections. Some of these parties, like the Italian MSI founded in 1945, the French
Front National (1972), the Belgian Vlaams Blok (1978) and the Dutch
Centrumpartij (1980), have emerged from extreme right groupuscules. Others,
like the Danish Fremskridtsparti (1972), the newly founded Lega Nord (1991) and
the Swedish Ny Demokrati (New Democracy, 1991), are based on anti-
establishment sentiments, but they cannot be called extreme right without
stretching that concept too far. As Klaus von Beyme (1988) and Michael Billig
(1989) have pointed out, difficulties generally arise when using the term extreme
right. Even though the term is frequently used by journalists and scholars alike, it
is hardly ever explicitly defined. Most writers just state that extreme right parties
are anti-democratic, xenophobic and extremely nationalist, without giving any
argument for why such parties should be labelled extreme right. Literally, extreme
right means at the very right of the political left-right scale. Yet the leaders of the
parties under investigation do not always consider themselves to be right-wing, let
alone extreme right. The Italian MSI, as well as the Dutch Centrumpartij
considered itself as «neither left nor right». 16 percent of the MSI delegates who
attended the 1991 party congress placed themselves in the center of the left-right
scale while 26 percent considered themselves left-wing (Ignazi and Ysmal,
1992:118).
Voters are not sure about the ideological position of these parties either.
Jean Tillie (1995) has shown that the Dutch Centrumdemocraten (CD) initially did
not fit very well in the left right ideological space in which the other Dutch parties
fitted. In the course of the eighties, however, the CD entered in the ideological
space created by the Dutch party-system and eventually, in 1992, was firmly
positioned at the extreme right of the left-right scale. Yet even in 1992 42 percent
of the Dutch voters considered the CD an extreme right party, but 12 percent
considered the CD as an extreme-left party.
In sum, there are quite a number of empirical problems related to the term
extreme right. But there are, as we will see in the next section, even more
theoretical problems involved in defining extreme right.
2. FASCISM AND THE CONCEPT OF «EXTREME RIGHT»
Piero Ignazi (1992:7-13) maintains that to be called extreme right a party
should not only be located on the very right edge of the left-right scale, but it
should also express a fascist ideology and an anti-system attitude. Other political
scientists tend to conceive the prefix «extreme» not as «very», but as anti-
democratic. Thus, extreme right and extreme left are the undemocratic fringes of
a democratic and pluralist political system (Sartori, 1982:210). According to Klaus
von Beyme (1988:2), such an approach tends to give a one-dimensional vision to
the political landscape and contains «an obsession with symmetry».
We may conclude that the concept of extreme right is linked to the theory
of totalitarianism in which fascism is put on par with communism. The term
extreme right is implicitly or explicitly equated with or related to the concept of
fascism. This conceptual framework is fairly consistent but creates a problem for
contemporary analysis, especially because historians tend to follow Ernst Nolte
((1963)1984) in limiting the concept of fascism to a specific historical period which
begins around 1920 and ends in 1945. The fascist label is then reserved for the
Fascist movement in Italy, the German National Sozialistische deutsche
Arbeiterpartei (NSDAP), the Austrofascism headed by Dollfuss and, at least
according to Ernst Nolte, the French movement Action Française. Historians are
very reluctant to use the term fascism for movements or regimes outside this
specific place and period. A certain diffidence about labeling contemporary
political parties as fascist also exists among social scientists. If the term (neo)
fascist is used at all, it is more often than not referring to movements which
explicitly hark back to the pre-war fascist movements (see Van Donselaar, 1993).
To use the term neo-fascism for some of the presentday anti-immigrant parties,
as Cheles et al. (1991) do, we clearly need a generic concept of extreme right.
Although there is apparently much hesitation in using the term fascism,
there definitely is a relationship between this concept and that of extreme right.
Even though there is little explicit agreement among scholars, they tend to use
the different concepts in a similar way. Quite often, the concept of fascism is
nested in the concept of extreme right, that is, all fascist parties are regarded as
extreme right parties but not all extreme right parties are considered fascist. A
fascist party is an extreme right party in a specific time period and with a specific
party organization based on the Führerprizip, strong leadership made into a party
principle. Following Sternhell (1976) we may say that fascism is defined in terms
of practices. Thus, the violent activities of a movement form a necessary corollary
to the doctrine which we will define below. Fascism demands an active
participation of the population in all fields of society and this obligatory political
participation defines its totalitarian character. The misgivings of intellectuals like
Oswald Spengler or Maurice Barrès about the NSDAP and Action Française
respectively, had more to do with the totalitarian claim of these parties than with
ideological differences. Many extreme right intellectuals, moreover, found the
fascist parties too plebeian for their liking. Their critique was on style  rather than
on ideological content. We propose to define the term extreme right as a concept
that refers to ideology and not to political practices. On the level of ideology,
extreme right equals generic fascism. In ‘real life’ however the extreme right is a
broader concept; it includes the fascist movement but also other tendencies.
3. DEFINING EXTREME RIGHT IDEOLOGY
In this section we will try to define the ideology of the extreme right
movement as it developed before the War. Ideology is defined by Martin Seliger
as «a conceptual frame of reference which provides criteria for choice and
decision by virtue of which the major activities of an organized community are
governed» (cited in Sternhell, 1976:318). A conceptual frame of reference is a set
of key concepts which are related in a specific way. The relations between these
key concepts do not have to be logically related, as long as they are
psychologically related. In the latter case the relations between the key concepts
are of an axiomatic nature, without any logical grounding. The logical relations
between the key elements in a political ideology are part of the political doctrine,
the psychological relations are part of the political axiom. Not just the extreme
right, but all ideologies are based on a political axiom. The political axiom of the
democratic ideology is expressed in the American Declaration of Independence
which claims that «all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their
Creator with certain unalienable Rights». The fact that this is indeed a political
axiom is shown in the outset of this sentence: «We hold these truths to be self-
evident...».
The political axiom of the extreme right is the direct opposite of the
democratic axiom. Extreme right ideology has developed as an anti-ideology, in
polemical opposition to the democratic creed (Linz, 1976). Social inequality forms
the basis of the political axiom of the extreme right. Inequality is perceived in two
ways: as social and moral differentiation and as social and moral hierarchy. Given
the fact that existing society is both differentiated and hierarchical, the social
axiom of the extreme right has a «natural» plausibility. Indeed, there are inborn
differences between human beings and people have different social positions.
The extreme right gives these empirical facts a moral significance:
«Because democratic majority rule denies the authority of the individual and
replaces it with the sheer number of the transitory mass, it transgresses the
aristocratic laws of nature («(...) sündigt es wider den aristokratischen
Grundgedanken der Natur»)» (Hitler, 1942:87).
Social hierarchy is explained and legitimized by reference to nature. This
‘common sense’ of the extreme right explains part of its attractiveness and forms
the mythical fundaments of the extreme right ideology. Although this myth of
natural hierarchy is characteristic of the political right in general, it does not define
the ideology of the extreme right. The specificity of the extreme right lies in its
political doctrine. The doctrine of the extreme right is made up of four different
themes which have been found in the scientific literature on the extreme right.
(Nolte, (1963) 1984; Sternhell, 1985, 1987; Chebel d’Apollonia, 1988; Mosse,
1981; Van den Toorn, 1975) They are the common denominators in the works of
Francisco Franco (1982), Adolf Hitler (1942), Charles Maurras (1978), Benito
Mussolini (1952) and José Antonio Primo de Rivera (1933). These themes are:
ethnic nationalism, anti-materialism, anti-parliamentarianism and conspiracy
theory.
Ethnic nationalism
The first element in the extreme right doctrine is ethnic nationalism. The
nation is not defined in political but in ethnic terms and thus has a biological
connotation. Political organization in itself therefore does not constitute the nation,
as it does in nationalism based on contract theories. The state should be an
expression of the ethnic community. They who do not belong to this ethnic
community are excluded from the nation. In his book on nationalism, Hans Kohn
(1945) has elaborated upon the distinction between ethnic or cultural nationalism
and contract or political nationalism. The latter is based on the principle of natural
rights or on utilitarian philosophy according to which the state should optimize the
welfare of citizens and its success is measured in terms of citizen’s wellbeing.
The nation is primarily a political and economic community. Ethnic nationalism, on
the other hand, is based on a metaphysical notion of nation. The nation has a
‘soul’ and membership is defined by descent, and by a common ‘destiny’.
Membership in the ethnic nation is based on ius sanguinis, whereas membership
in a nation based on contract is based on ius soli. Ethnic nationalism is expressed
both in terms of «blood» and «culture». In the extreme right discourse «ownness»
and «rooted» are juxtaposed to «alien» and «uprootedness».
Anti-materialism
The second element in the extreme right doctrine is anti-materialism.
Gentile wrote in his «Doctrine of Fascism»: (...) Fascism is against all individualist
abstractions based on materialism such as those which flourished in the 18th
century» (Mussolini (1952:67). Although materialist philosophy developed in the
18th century, extreme right parties usually attack Marxist and utilitarian doctrines
of the 19th century1. Anti-materialism attacks the rational choice model of civil
society, where interests define social actions and (lack of) solidarity. According to
the anti-materialist position, liberalism preaches the pursuit of private interests,
which leads to the fragmentation of society. Marxism, on the other hand,
preaches class warfare which equally leads to the destruction of the nation. For
tactical and historical reasons extreme right movements have emphasized their
anti-Marxist views rather than their anti-liberalism. Yet Marxism is closer to the
extreme right ideology because it has a similar diagnosis of bourgeois society,
even though its solutions are diametrically opposed to those of the extreme right.
Marxism and fascism share a holist conception of society (Silverman, 1985). The
extreme right pretends to provide a new synthesis between nationalism and
socialism. The term ‘Socialist Nationalism’ was coined by Maurice Barrès as early
as 1898 (Sternhell, 1976:326) and became one of the recurrent themes in
extreme right ideology. In the words of the British fascist leader Oswald Mosley:
«If you love your country you are national, and if you love your people you are
socialist» (Sternhell, 1976:321). Here we find the ambivalence which makes the
label «extreme right» problematic. The anti-liberal element in the doctrine can
take an anti-capitalist form and hence be considered as ‘left-wing’. This is also the
doctrinal basis for the slogan «Neither left, nor right» (Sternhell, 1987). The
individual should subordinate himself to the people, to the nation. The concepts
patriotism/heroism are juxtaposed to individualism/egoism.
Against democracy
The extreme right doctrine loathes democracy because democracy favours
quantity over quality. In part the extreme right borrows from the 19th century anti-
democratic tradition in that it assumes the mass of people to be incapable of
governing. Yet the anti-democratic critique is populist rather than elitist in content.
The political elites in a democracy do not represent the people, nor do they
pursue the common good. The political elite as a whole only strives for its own
material benefits, it is a parasitical class. The concept of a parasitical political
class harks back to Saint-simonism. Yet the extreme right adds something new to
the anti-democratic tradition. Majority rule is not just the rule of stupidity, as is
maintained in the Burkean tradition, nor is it just avarice and exploitation as in the
utopian socialist tradition; democracy in the extreme right tradition is the rule of
cowardice. The political leaders hide behind the democratic procedures because
they are cowards. According to Adolf Hitler:
«The invention of democracy brings forward a human quality which has recently
grown into a real shame, that is the cowardice of the major part of our so-called
«leadership». How happy they are to be able to hide all important decisions
behind the skirts of this so-called majority» (Hitler, 1942:89).
Hitler’s contempt for the masses was immense, but his contempt for the
political elite was even greater. The extreme right critique of democracy thus
becomes a critique of political leadership. The political elites in a parliamentary
democracy are cowardly and slick, masters in the manipulation of public opinion
at best. They refuse to take any personal responsibility for their decisions. The
anti-democratic bravado of the extreme right never directly attacked the common
people, as in the conservative tradition, it aimed at discrediting democratic
leadership.
A second critique of democracy is that it extinguishes differences between
people that are natural as well as socially useful. «To organize means to
differentiate, that is to create useful differences, to democratize means to
equalize which is sterile and even mortal» (cited by Tournier, forthcoming).
A third critique of democracy is the inverse of the former: democracy leads
to money-rule. «Démocratie vaut ploutocratie, gouvernement du peuple signifie
gouvernement de l’or» (Action Française, 12 june 1914). The revolt against
democracy is a revolt against politics, or rather against «the political class».
Politicians, according to extreme right discourse, do not stand for political ideals,
not even for societal interests; they just stand for their own interests. Hence, the
political class is corruption-prone.
Finally, democracy is associated with quarreling, with partisan politics. The
extreme right wants to do away with political parties: «Nobody was ever born into
a political party; on the other hand, we are all born in a family, we all live in a
municipality, we all toil in a job» (Primo de Rivera, 1933:22). In the anti-
democratic discourse of the extreme right the political class/the politicians is
juxtaposed with the people/the common man. The political establishment is
accused of greed, selfishness and cowardice.
We should add, however, that the attacks upon parliamentary democracy
are always launched in the name of ‘true democracy’ or pure democracy
(Mussolini, 1952:72). Anti-democratic opinions are quite often wrapped up in
populist rhetoric about direct democracy. Yet in the more intellectual writings of
the extreme right the attacks on democracy were quite often fierce and open (e.g.
Julius Evola, 1934). Nowadays it is difficult to find in the party programs of the
extreme right openly an all-out attacks upon democracy. Such attacks are
considered illegitimate in Western Europe and in Germany such attacks are even
unconstitutional and thus prohibited. Therefore, in contemporary extreme right
discourse the assault upon democracy will take the form of attacks against the
moral integrity of the members of parliament and against the political parties. An
example of the latter is the practice used by the Front National to indicate the four
main French parties as the «Gang of four»; this attack on the main parties in
Belgium is also found in the propaganda of the Vlaams Blok (Spruyt, 1995).
Conspiracy theory
The fourth recurrent theme in extreme right discourse is international
conspiracy. This can be seen as the inversion of the «aristocratic plot» that
characterized Jacobinism (Furet, 1981:54 ff). These «plots» appeared during the
French revolution in times of acute danger of civil war. The aristocracy did indeed
-as has been convincingly demonstrated by historians of the French Revolution-
conspire against the revolution in order to prepare their return and to regain their
possessions and former positions. In the extreme right discourse, however, the
conspiracy is not just related to an acute danger, but to a perceived decadence, a
decline of the nation. The aristocracy has been replaced by other ‘enemies
within’: Freemasonry and Jewry who have one characteristic in common: they are
internationalist, and thus, by nature, lack patriotism. The conspiracies serve to
explain why the nation is not as strong as it should be according to the ideology of
ethnic superiority. They are related to political opponents who have, in extreme
right discourse, no legitimate right to exist. The conspiracy is also related to the
theory of democratic corruption, because the political class is -as we have seen-
only out for the money and thus can easily be bought off by a secret money-
syndicate -like that of the Dreyfus family in France. The fact that Jews and
Freemasons are supposed to spend money for their plotting also links extreme
right conspiracy theory to another element in the doctrine: that of anti-materialism.
The money power of an ‘international plutocracy’ undermines the national unity
and the prosperity of the nation. Freemasonry is associated with Liberalism and
Jacobinism. According to Charles Maurras, the French republic had always been
dominated by four «estates» (quatre États confédérés): the Jews, the
Protestants, the foreigners and the Freemasons. These four categories had to be
neutralized to root out the «democratic pest» (cited in Chebel d’Apollonia,
1988:75).
After 1917 the Communists were included in the confederation of
conspirators, but this time the conspiracy theory was directly related to reality.
The Comintern was indeed a secret international organization led by a foreign
power (the Soviet Union) with a considerable influence in domestic politics in
other countries. In short, it was organized according to the ideal-type of extreme
right conspiracy theory. On the other hand the Communist theory of fascism was
also fraught with conspiracy thinking (cf. Dimitrov, 1935). In a sense, one might
say that the relation between Fascism and Communism was a ‘folie à deux’. In
the extreme right conspiracy theory the innocent people are juxtaposed with
malicious foreign powers and their internal assistants: the ‘enemy within’ (Franco,
1982:8). More recently extreme right conspiracy theory is to be found in the denial
of the Holocaust. Enveloped in a historical-juridical discourse in which the
existence of gas chambers in German concentration camps is denied, the inner
logic of the revisionist thesis, which holds that there never was a Nazi policy to
exterminate the Jews, goes beyond the apology of the Third Reich. It also begs
the question how the entire public opinion in Western Europe and America has
come to believe in «the Holocaust lie» (Lipstadt, 1993). The fact that so many
historians of the Holocaust are of Jewish origin already points out in the direction
of the answer. The Jews themselves have invented the Holocaust to force
peoples and governments into supporting the Jewish state of Israel. Hence
conspiracy theory was adapted to be used in the anti-Zionist Third World
movement (Eatwell, 1991:122).
Extreme right ideology takes human inequality as its axiomatic foundation.
Its doctrine extols ethnic nationalism, rejects economic materialism and attacks
parliamentary democracy. It contains a manichaean view of a world order in
which the enemy is involved in an international conspiracy against the nation.
4. DISCUSSION
If we propose a new definition of extreme right ideology how does it differ
from the already existing ones? Of course it does not differ very much from the
mainstream definitions of extreme right ideology. In most literature the aspects of
nationalism, anti-democracy and anti-materialism in extreme right ideology are
mentioned. But many of the definitions are virtually «shopping lists» as Mudde
(1995) phrased it. They also include racism, intolerance, elitism, militarism, want
for strong leadership. The main objection against such shopping list definition is
that it becomes unworkable. The rule of simplicity requires that we should select
as few characteristics as possible to define the elephant, not as many as
possibly. Roger Griffin’s attempt to formulate a generic definition of fascism is for
this reason very interesting indeed, because it limits the ideology of fascism to
two elements: a «palingenetic myth» and «populist ultra-nationalism» (Griffin,
1991:32 ff). Palingenesis refers to «the sense of a new start or of a regeneration
after a phase of crisis or decline». The second element of Griffin’s definition is
«populist ultra-nationalism» which refers to «forms of nationalism which ‘go
beyond’, and hence reject, anything compatible with liberal institutions or with the
tradition of Enlightenment humanism which underpins them». Against this
definition, which is very attractive in its apparent simplicity, I have two objections:
First, the palingenetic element is part and parcel of all ethnic nationalism
(see Smith, 1986:192) and therefore the concept of ‘palingenetic ultra-
nationalism’ contains a pleonasm, even though the concept also implies
something ‘magical’ something ‘gnostic’ in the extreme right’s national myth. At
the same time, the term ultra-nationalism (including populism) is stretched to a
point where the concept also includes the rejection of democracy:
«(...) populist ultra-nationalism rejects the principles both of absolutism and of
pluralist representative democracy» (Griffin, 1991:37).
Hence the third element of the extreme right doctrine is explicitly included
in Griffin’s definition. However, anti-materialism -according to many scholars a
crucial element which distinguishes the extreme right from other far right
ideologies- is not included in Griffin’s definition of fascist ideology. We consider
this a major flaw of Griffin’s definition because it fails to distinguish between the
neo-liberal right which praises the market and attacks all equalizing state
interventions and the extreme right which may also attack levelling state
interventions, but never praises the market as the alpha and omega of society.
The very attraction of the extreme right lies in the fundamental rejection of a
society based on individualism and egoism and its reference to higher moral
values. Bruno Mégret, one of the representatives of the Front National in the
European Parliament, said in an interview:
«The materialism of the consumer society is something that destroys all nations
and peoples».
Karel Dillen of the Vlaams Blok held similar view and so did Giuseppe
Rauti of the MSI. We have good reasons to include anti-materialism in a definition
of the extreme right doctrine.
Nearest to our definition is that of Zeev Sternhell who defines fascist
ideology as «a synthesis of organic nationalism and anti-Marxist socialism, a
revolutionary movement based on a rejection of liberalism, democracy and
Marxism» (Sternhell, 1987:148). The critique launched by other scholars that
such definition does not allow a distinction between fascism and political
Catholicism which sought to forge a viable alternative to liberalism, communism
and fascism (Conway, 1990:1) is not convincing, because political Catholicism
lacks the ethnic nationalism which is characteristic of extreme right ideology.
Conspiracy theory is not very often included in a definition of the extreme
right ideology. Yet, we consider this as an essential element, because it is the
ideological fundament of fascism’s violence and its totalitarian claim. The secrecy
in the movement’s activities -which are a direct result of its conspiracy theory-
strengthen the elitism of the fascist movement. This is an important psychological
advantage for the militants. As in its extreme left counterpart -Leninism- the idea
of an international conspiracy provides fascist ideology with an axe to grind. The
idea that the enemy is exceptionally strong leads to an all out struggle against
him. The idea of a heroic warfare between good and evil allows all necessary
steps to be taken and frees the leaders of the state from ethical restraints on the
part of their behavior. We are still living in an international civil war, Francisco
Franco maintained in december 1949:
«If the freemasonry would not overstep the national boundaries, if they did not
meddle in international affairs, we could be indifferent to what happens in other
countries. But because this is not so, because they pursue political objectives
over other peoples, these cannot be indifferent to the conspiracies and the
collusion against them. This is most evident in the strongest and most powerful
countries that until yesterday have employed the freemasonry as an instrument to
undermine, divide and deceit their rivals and their neighbours» (Franco, 1982:97).
Franco used the same means as his enemies: he wrote his articles about
the freemasonry under pseudonym. According to Hannah Arendt (1973:435ff)
conspiracy theory is under totalitarian rule eventually replaced by the notion of
«objective enemy» which shortcuts the needs to «prove» any conspiracy at all.
Both the concept of conspiracy and that of «objective enemies» are based on a
manichaean worldview and excludes a pluralist political system.
But conspiracy theory has also a populist edge: conspiracy theory is the
poor man’s social science: it replaces the invisible hand by a visible one, it
replaces the counterintuitive law of unintended effects by plots and purposes of
friends and foes, of heroes and scoundrels. According to Hannah Arendt
(1973:352) the isolated individuals that form the ‘masses’ long «for a completely
consistent, comprehensible, and predictable world». It is the revolt of the masses
against «realism», against common sense. Conspiracy theory allows the
commonest man to believe that he belongs to a vanguard or an elite of society.
«Conspiracy theory appeals precisely because it offers a simple explanation of
complex and diverse political events. In the latter case, the emphasis is more on
the psychological compensations to be gained from a belief in conspiracy theory.
Thus, there could be a sense of superiority which comes from believing that one
knows a hidden truth» (Eatwell, 1991:140).
Conspiracy theory is a simplification of social reality which increases the
popular appeal and enhances the action-orientedness of the rank and file.
Finally, it should be stressed that few students of political ideology make a
distinction between axiom and doctrine as we have done. It will allow us to
distinguish more clearly between the extreme right and other varieties of the right,
like the conservative right and the democratic right, which share the axiom of
human inequality but not the doctrine. One could argue that in the above
presented argument the concept of democratic right is a contradiction in terminis.
If the right is characterized by an axiom that is the antinomy of the democratic
axiom how can the right possibly be democratic? This contradiction can be solved
when we situate the right in a historical context. Indeed from the French
Revolution onwards the right has actively opposed the introduction of general
suffrage and quite often hindered the more modest democratic reforms. In the
process of democratization of government the term democratic right was certainly
a contradiction in terms. But once democracy was installed a substantial part of
the right adapted to the new system of government and even became a staunch
defender of a system which became historically opposed to the totalitarian branch
of the democratic movement: Communism. The right has found a philosophical
anchor to accommodate the axiom of the right with democratic procedures. A
powerful tool in bringing this about has been the theory of democracy defended
by Joseph Schumpeter in his «Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy» (1943).
This economic theory of democracy maintains that democracy is not and should
not be more than an institutional arrangement to produce a government in a
competition among the political leaders for the people’s vote. This theory, which
has rightfully been labelled as «democratic elitism» makes a clear distinction
between the political elite and the mass of voters and thus combines the political
axiom of the right with the democratic creed (for a critical discussion see
Fennema, 1995).
5. EXTREME RIGHT PARTIES
So far we have concentrated in our definition of the extreme right on
ideology. Ideology in our opinion is the main defining principle of extreme right
parties. Yet, many authors claim the other aspects also contribute to the identity
of political parties. Militants, voters and the relative position in the party system
also contribute to the party’s identity. In a seminal article Ignazi and Ysmal (1992)
compare the political profile of the delegates at the party congresses of the Front
National and the MSI. Accordingly they define the MSI as a party of the «old
extreme right» whereas the Front National belongs to the «new extreme right».
For all we can make up from their article the difference between the old and the
new extreme right lies in the acceptation by the new extreme right of neo-liberal
policies. More recently Ignazi (1995) sees a distinction between traditional and
post-industrial extreme right parties. «The second group is alien to fascist imprint.
These parties developed in the eighties, in a socio-political climate totally different
from that of the pre-war decades. These parties are defined as «post-industrial»
because they are byproducts of the conflicts of the post-industrial society, where
material interests are no longer so central and bourgeoisie and working class are
neither so neatly defined nor so radically antagonistic» (Ignazi, 1995:7). Note that
the post-industrial extreme right is defined here in terms of context rather than in
content. It reminds us that we cannot neglect the social context in which extreme
right parties operate. However, when it comes to defining the programs Ignazi
speaks about «a mixture, often magnificent and fallacious, of private initiative and
social protection (limited to the native), of modernizing inputs and traditional
reminiscences». This brings us not much further. Ignazi claims that also the
extreme right has become post-modern. But had not the traditional extreme right
also been a mixture of modernizing inputs and traditional reminiscences?
Hans-Georg Betz’ (1994) analysis of ‘right wing populism’ concentrates on
the electorates of the extreme right in Western Europe. In his book one hardly
finds an attempt to define the extreme right. He explains the electoral success of
extreme right parties rather than defining them. Yet explaining the phenomenon is
at least partly defining it. Thus, when the Nazi voters are supposed to «revolt
against modernity» as Lipset (1981:23) wants it, this adds to the definition of the
extreme right by emphasizing its middle class basis. If, on the other hand the
voters react against social disintegration and are to be found amongst the social
isolated individuals of all classes as Bendix (1952) maintains, then the extreme
right phenomenon is different again. In Bendix’ theoretical framework the
communitarian aspects of extreme right ideology are stressed. Hans-Georg Betz
seems to follow Bendix’ line of reasoning (fascism as the mobilization of the
marginal men), even though he does refer to Lipset (1981) and Childers (1983)
and not to Bendix. Betz’ central thesis is that social fragmentation and
individualization of risk explains the resurgence of a radical right that expresses of
resentment rather than anything else. Betz distinguishes radical right-wing
populism from the extreme right (1994:108). Rather than extreme right ideology,
the radical right expresses neoliberal -or xenophobic populism. This is a very
interesting distinction which may help us to ‘deconstruct’ the political family of
racist and extreme right parties in different sections. Betz’ theoretical framework,
however, tends to de-emphasize the extreme right elements in the party
programs. Moreover, Betz does not explain why a process of social fragmentation
should induce the losers of modernization to require more neoliberal policies
rather than less. In this respect Wilhelm Heitmeyers title «Why do people act
against their own interest?» (1993) is intriguing, but the question has still to be
answered. We will come back to this problem in section 7 when discussing
protest votes.
The most common explanation for political xenophobia is provided by the
theory which takes social isolation as the independent variable. This theory has
been formulated by Hannah Arendt:
«it is only natural that the masses of a highly atomized society (...) have tended
toward an especially violent nationalism» (Arendt, 1951:317).
Bendix (1952) has explained the electoral success of the NSDAP in
Germany in similar terms. For The Netherlands this thesis has been put forward
by Nooy (1969) in his path-breaking study of the electorate of the radical right-
wing Farmers’ Party. A person who feels socially isolated feels powerless and
distrusts society, so the argument goes. Such feelings can lead, under certain
circumstances, to a search for a ‘consensus ex machina’. Ethnic nationalism is a
form of kinship illusion, it created an imagined community along ethnic lines.
Hence, strong beliefs may arise that the expulsion of foreigners will restore the
idealized status quo ante  when citizens were still law-abiding and social life
appeared more predictable and familiar. A recent survey among the
autochthonous population in Amsterdam has corroborated this theory. Ethnic
nationalism and social isolation were indeed positively related to preference for
anti-immigrant parties. Furthermore, feelings of social isolation strengthened the
positive relationship between ethnic nationalism and preference for anti-immigrant
parties (Fennema and Tillie, 1994). This theory provides for an explanation in
terms of ethnic nationalism, which is both a constitutive elements of extreme right
ideology and of racist ideology.
What this paragraph shows is that a discussion about the concept to be
used to define presentday anti-immigrant parties is narrowly related to the
explanation of what causes the rise of such parties.
6. RACIST PARTIES
In this paper the term anti-immigrant party has a descriptive non-
theoretical status. We will try to find out whether anti-immigrant parties can
properly be labeled extreme right. That is, whether they have indeed an extreme
right ideology, an extreme right rank and file and an extreme right electorate.
Subsequently we will see whether these parties can also be labeled racist.
Because racist parties and extremeright parties are neither identical nor nested
(as in the case of fascism and extreme right) but rather overlapping concepts, we
have to define the term racist parties separately. The overlap lies mainly in the
strong emphasis on ethnic nationalism which one finds in racist parties as well as
in extreme right parties. An example of a racist party which is definitely not
extreme right may be the British Conservative Party under Margaret Thatcher
(see Miles and Phizaclea, 1984) or the Greek PASOK under Andreas
Papandreou (see Elias Dimitras, 1992:252). An example of an extreme right party
which is not considered racist by most scholars is the Spanish Falange during the
thirties and the Italian MSI during the seventies.
To find an useful definition of racist parties is not an easy task because
racist parties have to hide their racist identity because of legal or social restraints
(see Van Donselaar, 1993). Thus, racist parties defend their policy positions often
in terms of cultural incompatibility. Their own, national, culture is presented as
homogeneous and fixed, while alien cultures are also seen as permanently fixed.
Barker (1981) has labeled such arguments ‘new racism’. But is it really new and,
more important, is it racist? Racist arguments are, in our view, all those
arguments which explain social inequality by reference to biological differences
which are hereditary. Racism differentiates between groups of people by
combining biological and social characteristics which are both considered
hereditary. Essentially racism implies a downgrading of outgroups according to
quasi-biological criteria. This means that to differentiate according to cultural
habitus is in itself not racist. Even to look down upon other peoples’ culture is not
necessarily racist. Generalizing assertions about ethnic groups need not be
racist. What, then, makes the theory of cultural incompatibility racist? In the first
place because cultural characteristics are ossified into quasi-biological attributes.
The argumentative essence of new racism is that cultures cannot be changed,
that some -not all- cultures are incompatible and that culture is in some way
inbred. In the words of a columnist of the Daily Telegraph: «Parliament can no
more turn a Chinese into an Englishman than it can turn a man into a woman».
This is a very succinct formulation of new racism. Immigration is resisted
by reference to cultural incompatibility, but this cultural incompatibility is in the
final analysis based on biological arguments. There are variations in the biological
argumentation as expressed, for example, in the difference between the use of
straight forward biological reasoning and the use of biological metaphors. But
difference can also be measured according to the frequency with which biological
reasoning is employed or biological metaphors used. In new racist discourse
biological argumentation is restricted to metaphorical expressions like the one
quoted from the Daily Telegraph.
Yet new racism is different from old racism which is no t based on
incompatibility of «equal cultures» but on a hierarchy of races and culture. Inferior
races have an inferior culture and therefore are subordinates to the higher race
that has a higher culture. The old racism grew out of a colonial context and is
strongest in former white settler colonies. Colonial racism has been used to
subordinate rather than to expel, to legitimate socio-economic inferiority of a
racialized underclass. Colonial racism formed the counterpoint of the natural
rights philosophy. Indeed, if everybody already possessed the right to Life, Liberty
and Estate in the state of nature, it was hard to see how some people could be
rightfully deprived of such rights in the colonies. Colonial exploitation based on
slave production could be made compatible with the liberal ideology and practice
in the metropolis only by arguing that the slaves were really not human beings
endowed with natural rights. And this is exactly what was done in racist theory.
Colonial racism had its apogee in the nineteenth century, and is thus a
relatively recent and short-lived phenomenon even though its effects are long-
lasting and disastrous for the victims. It is aimed at subordinating the racially
defined group within the nation. The racially defined Other may be regarded as a
second class citizen, or -more likely- as not a citizen at all, but he or she is
considered as an essential part of society, upon which its economic welfare
depends2. In many ways colonial racism and new racism resemble each other,
however, in one aspect they are diametrically opposed: colonial racism aims at
subordination, new, or ethnic racism aims at expulsion. This is the main reason
why it is difficult to compare the racist parties in the USA (like the Ku Klux Klan)
with the racist parties in Europe.
Racist parties in Western Europe argue against immigration, but one
cannot reverse the argument: not all parties that resist immigration are racist. One
can defend an immigration-stop also with non-racist arguments. Indeed, the very
concept of popular sovereignty implies that the citizens of a country are entitled to
decide that no foreigners will be allowed to enter the country, for example with the
ecological argument that the country is already overpopulated, or with the
economic argument that no work is available for the potential immigrants.
Presently, many racist parties are forced to hide their racism because of
legal constraints or fear of public opinion. Hence they will defend their anti-
immigrant position by reference to non-racial arguments. To decide whether or
not a party is racist we therefore not only look at the content of the programs and
propaganda but use a number of additional criteria.
A first additional criterium is the position parties take with reference to
racial violence. Racist parties tend to emphasize the violence of immigrants
whereas they vindicate violence against immigrants. They deny the discrimination
to which immigrants are subjected but maintain, on the contrary, that the native
population is discriminated against. In a way this «blaming the victim» eventually
may end up in denying social and historical reality altogether as the Holocaust
denial shows.
A second criterium is the priority which is given to the immigrants problem.
If a party sees the criminality of immigrants or asylum-seekers as the one and
only political issue, then this party may be labeled racist, even if their public
statements regarded in isolation are not racist. The one-sidedness of the political
propaganda gives the impression that immigrants are the cause of all evil and
thus they get the blame for all social predicaments. Racist parties hence quite
often are ‘single issue’ parties. And here we may find an important difference
between racist parties and the extreme right, because the latter are, by definition,
not single issue parties.
Finally, we look at the relations maintained by party leaders and militants
with other organizations which are (more) openly racist. Because racism is
considered illegitimate in most countries, racist parties tend to ‘clean up’ their
political program. Their ‘front-stage’ activities are conscientiously screened and
‘back-stage’ activities are hidden from the public eye by secret organizations with
which many interlocking directorates exist but which are formally independent.
Now we have defined racist parties we are able to distinguish these parties
from extreme right parties. The main distinction between extreme right -and racist
parties is that the latter are single issue parties, focusing their attention on
immigrants and immigration. In the wake of this attention, which can turn into an
obsession, there often is an emphasis on law and order and a fierce opposition to
government policies. Yet this opposition, however fierce, does not turn into anti-
regime opposition. Racist parties, contrary to the extreme right are not anti-
parliamentary, nor are they necessarily anti-materialist. Nor do the racist parties
have a conspiracy theory.
The main overlap between racist parties and the extreme right -in terms of
doctrine- is the emphasis on ethnic nationalism. This explains partly why scholars
who wish to see no distinction between racist parties and the extreme right
emphasize the «ultra-nationalist» character of these parties to the expense of all
other ideological characteristics (e.g. Griffin, 1991).
Our theoretical analysis could stop here if not for another label which has
been frequently used in the analysis of anti-immigrant parties.
7. PROTEST PARTIES
Many journalists and scholars tend to  label the anti-immigrant parties as
protest parties. Betz (1994) for example speaks about «resentment as politics».
But the operationalization of the concept of ‘protest voter’ is hardly ever given
serious attention. More often than not scholars who consider the anti-immigrant
parties as protest parties concentrate their empirical analysis on the electorates.
The term protest party refers to the characteristics of the voter rather than the
characteristics of the party program (Stouthuysen, 1993; Van Donselaar in Van
Praag, 1983; Betz, 1994:3). The voter, according to this argument, has not cast
his vote on racist grounds, but rather to express disenchantment with the political
system. Unfortunately, this theoretical concept of ‘protest voter’ is not very well
elaborated: are not all voters who do not vote for the ruling parties ‘protest
voters’? This objection can be dealt with if we accept the concept of anti-regime
party as defined by Sartori. There are parties, according to Sartori which can be
considered as not just ‘loyal opposition’. They reject the political system rather
than the government in power, and thus may attract voters who ‘protest’ against
the political establishment. According to Betz «these parties are posing the most
significant challenge to the established structure and politics of West Europe
today» (Betz, 1994:3). But now we have shifted the argument and we are back to
square one. If protest voters are defined by the character of the party they vote
for, it becomes necessary to define the term ‘protest party’ with more precision.
We will discuss this problem in the next section.
7.1 Protest voters
In this section the protest voter should be defined sui generis. In most
electoral studies the term protest vote is a residual category. It refers to the votes
which cannot be explained with the theoretical model used in the analysis. Hence
one distinguishes ideological votes, strategic votes and protest vote. Yet, the
distinction between strategic votes and protest votes is not always clear. An
elaborate and precise definition of protest vote has recently been presented by
Van der Eijk and Franklin (1995), who define a protest voter as a voter who cast a
vote for a party which does not offer the maximum to him or her in terms of party
utility (see for the concept of party utility: Tillie, 1995). The most important factor
contributing to party utility is the party’s position on the ideological left-right
continuum. Another factor contributing to the party’s utility is its size. Many voters
prefer a larger party over a smaller one because of its political efficacy. A voter
may vote for a larger party in spite of the fact that a smaller party is closer to his
or her ideological preference. This is called strategic voting.
A protest voter casts a vote for a party that has a position on the left-right
continuum which is not in accordance with the voter’s own selfpositioning on that
continuum, nor can it be explained as strategic voting. This may be the case
because the party he votes for is not preferred because of its stance on particular
issues, nor for its chances to enter the government, but because of its (perceived)
opposition to the political regime. On the basis of an operationalization of this
definition it is possible to determine the number of protest voters with some
precision. But how should such a ‘non-utilitarian’ vote be interpreted? In a way the
voter’s choice is a choice against politics. One could, therefore, maintain that a
protest vote expresses a lack of rationality of the voter. This is the argument
presented by Hannah Arendt, who maintains that social isolation creates
selfdestructive and irrational impulses.
«The revolt of the masses against «realism», common sense, and all «the
plausibilities of the world» (Burke) was the result of their atomization, of their loss
of social status along with which they lost the whole sector of communal
relationships in which common sense makes sense» (Arendt, 1973:352).
Although this explanation has, with the benefit of hindsight, a strong case
to make for the electoral attraction of the NSDAP, their is also a less spectacular
interpretation of the protest voting. In this interpretation the rationality of the voter
is not questioned. The choice of the party itself may, so the argument goes, not
be according to party utility, but it may still fall within the range of rational
behavior. The voter may vote for a party that is ostracized by the political elites
and thus vote against the political establishment. The protest voter takes the
opportunity to «put in the boot» (Van der Eijk and Franklin 1995:298). This
argument would imply that a protest vote can only be a vote for parties which
have been an object of general and public rejection by all other parties, as used
to be the case with the communist parties and still is the case with most anti-
immigrant parties. Hence one can define the protest party as a political party that
attracts many protest votes. This interpretation assumes that a party can only
attract protest votes in a dialectical process between the party’s behavior and the
responses if the political elite which provide the protest party with a ‘spoiled
identity’ (Van Donselaar, 1993) that makes it, paradoxically, attractive to protest
voters. It remains of course a matter of subtle empirical analysis to find out
whether this is indeed the case (for an excellent treatment of the Vlaams Blok
voters see Billiet and De Witte, 1995).
7.2 Protest parties
Yet, this is not the end of the story. In some instances the term protest
party is clearly meant to define a certain type of party by its program rather than
by its spoiled identity. Many observers mention the Swiss Automobile Party, the
Belgian Rossem-list and the Danish Progress Party as typical for a new type of
anti-politics party. The Dutch Farmersparty, founded in 1965, which had a large
support in the big cities, was an early example. These parties have an anti-tax
program, combining a neo-liberal and an anarchist perspective. Colorful figures
tend to play a predominant role, as was the case with Bert Karlsson who founded
Nye Demokrati in Sweden and with Mogens Glistrup who founded the
Fremskridtsparti in Denmark. The latter declared that paying taxes was damaging
the country and compared tax-evasion with the resistance against the Nazi
occupation. And as if to prove that he was a resistance fighter he was sent to jail
for tax-evasion. In other instances we find parties which are founded by persons
with the intention of preventing incarceration as was the case with Ruiz Mateos in
Spain who campaigned for the European elections in 1989 and much to his own
surprise won 3 seats in the European parliament (Pilar del Castillo, 1995). One
may wonder whether Berlusconi did not have similar motives when he founded
Forza Italia. All this, however, does not mean that parties like that of Ruiz Mateos
or Berlusconi do not have a political program.
One should be aware of the fact that all parties which present a radically new
political discourse are accused of not having a proper party program. The political
establishment tends to judge the political weight of a new political formation
according to traditional criteria. Nearly all new political parties have been labeled
as «protest parties» when they first appeared on the political scene. The political
analyst should be aware of this and not simply copy the political vocabulary of the
established elites.
Sometimes, however, the new ‘a-political politicians’ seem indeed to have
no political program at all. They call for fun-politics as did the stand-up comedian
Coluche in France or erotic-politics, as did the porno-actress Ciciollina of the
Radical Party in Italy. Such persons can be singled out for their style rather than
their program, but they all tend to call for some soft form of civil disobedience.
Such parties can indeed be labeled protest parties, but these should be set apart
from the extreme right, because they only share the anti-parliamentary theme of
the extreme right doctrine. They should also be set apart from the racist parties.
Their main concern is not immigration -even though their leaders sometimes utter
racist phrases- nor do they defend violence against foreigners. Their main target
is not the immigrants but politics in general.
Nevertheless, there remains an uneasy link between the attitude of political
protest and the traditional extreme right. This linkage is best expressed in the
seminal article of Juan Linz, «Some Notes Toward a Comparative Study of
Fascism in Sociological Historical Perspective» (1976). Linz defends the thesis
that fascist movements «were latecomers on the political scene, at the time when,
in most countries, the party system had already been crystallized». Therefore,
fascism is forced into an anti-system position and develops an anti-ideology. Linz
defined fascism «as a hypernationalist, often pan-nationalist, anti-parliamentary,
anti-liberal, anti-communist, populist and therefore anti-proletarian, partly anti-
capitalist and anti-bourgeois, anti-clerical, or at least, non-clerical movement»
(Linz, 1976:12). Fascism had to carve out a niche in the ideological field occupied
by liberalism, marxism and conservatism; it had to find its place in the electoral
space already defined in terms of left and right; it had to compete for militants with
the already established mass movements, like the socialist -communist- and
conservative parties. It was not able, so Linz argues, to attach itself to a certain
social class or segment of society. It has to draw its support from all classes,
regions and occupations. The fascist party was a catch-all party avant la lettre. It
was a protest movement by temporal and structural necessity. The main
difference then, between the «anti-character» of the extreme right and the protest
parties in the narrow sense of the word is that the latter do no develop a
fulfledged ideology and do not aim at taken state-power. Protest parties are
typically single issue parties which do not provide an alternative for the political
system they attack. The correspondence between racist -and protest parties lies
in the fact that both are the lepers in the political arena. Racist parties may
become protest parties for this very reason. With the extreme right the protest
parties share the ‘anti-politics’ attitude which tend to steer the protest parties in
the direction of anti-parliamentarianism.
8. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper we have tried to disentangle some definitional and conceptual
knots which one inevitably encounters when studying anti-immigrant parties in
Western Europe. We have defined the extreme right parties in terms of a
fulfledged ideology, racist parties as typically single issue parties with an anti-
immigrant platform and protest parties as parties that attract many protest votes.
These latter parties sometimes are called extreme right or ‘xenophobic’ because
their leaders have made xenophobic remarks. However, since they do not meet
our criteria for calling them extreme right or racist, these parties do not belong to
the political family which we will call extreme right.
We have noticed in passing that the labeling of anti-immigrant parties as
extreme right, racist or protest parties is far from neutral. In the political arena to
be labeled ‘racist’ or ‘extreme right’ is tantamount to being excommunicated from
the political elite if not from the political arena. It creates a spoiled identity and in
some countries -like Germany- it may even lead to prohibition of the party. Hence
to prevent this label is for many anti-immigrant parties a matter of political or legal
survival. Whether or not such a label is attached to a certain party is at least
partly dependent on the scientific community which provides the ‘expertise’ upon
which a political or legal judgement may be based. Hence the discussions within
the scientific community directly influences the political discussion and the other
way around: through various means politics sets the agenda for scientific
research on anti-immigrant parties. The very tight relationship between the
political and the scientific discussion makes it even more necessary to mark the
boundaries between the two arenas.
The labeling of anti-immigrant parties is by no means neutral in purely
scientific terms. There is a relation between research methodology and
conceptual framework. Those who start from a «continuity thesis», for example,
tend to concentrate on militants and will more often than not label the parties
‘extreme right’, referring to the political careers of some older militants (Van
Donselaar, 1993). Those who start from the migration perspective will tend to
focus on the political process in which resentment against immigrants is
formulated. These scholars tend to label the parties «racist» or «xenophobic»
(Husbands, 1983 and 1988). Those who concentrate on the electoral support of
anti-immigrant parties tend to focus on the motivation of the individual voter and
frequently use the term «protest party» or «right-wing populism» (Betz, 1994;
Pfahl-Traughber, 1994). Finally those who concentrate on party programs and -
ideology are generally hesitant to give any label at all because the parties are
quite different in the programs and ideology (see Mudde, 1995a and 1995b).
Without a elaborate definition of extreme right ideology is it difficult, if not
impossible to decide whether a given party is extreme right. Hence te work of
scholars, like Mudde, who refrain from a clearcut definition, is bound to remain
descriptive.
We suggest that the study of political programs is important to see whether
the anti-immigrant parties should be called extreme right parties, ideologically
distinct from other right-wing parties. Analyzing their program we may conclude
that some anti-immigrant parties should properly be called xenophobic or racist
parties, others are extreme right parties, while again others conform to the
definition of protest parties.
If we study militants, the focus is more on the political style and practices
of parties. It may be the case that party militants consistently harass immigrants
and attack their property and hence their party can be properly labeled racist.
Here the «backstage» of the parties becomes an important element in the
research strategy. The role of violence in extreme right formations should be
analysed in more detail to find out whether the violence is a crucial feature. We
have reasons to assume that violence is less instrumental more expressive in
extreme right movements than in other political movements.
By focusing on the electorates we may find out whether the voters can
properly be labeled protest voters or should be considered a xenophobic issue
voters. We also are able to relate the anti-immigrant parties to the other parties in
the system and to see whether these parties fit into the discursive field which
defines the left-right ideological dimension. Hence we can decide whether the
term extreme right refers to the space at the outer limit of the left right scale, or
whether the term refers to a position beyond right and left.
NOTES
I owe gratitude to Frank Elbers, Chris Husbands and Jean Tillie for stimulating discussions and to Dante
Germino and Cees van der Eijk for critical remarks.
1. But see the fierce attacks on Rousseau by José Antonio Primo de Rivera (1933).
2. Thus, a political theorist from nineteenth century America defends slavery with the arguments that it is the
only way of building a multi-racial society. The slave republic had the historic task of «erecting a nationality
upon the union of races, where other nations have but one» (Sollors, 1980).
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